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Imposing Values is a critique of regulation from the perspective of nonlibertarian
“classical liberalism.” More precisely, the book focuses on regulatory regimes
that currently exist in the United States (viii), and it criticizes a subset of such
regimes, which Arnold terms the “modern liberal regulatory agenda” (132–33),
encompassing the following:
A. Regulation of the employment relation
1. Mandatory terms or conditions of employment, speciﬁcally, laws man-
dating a minimum wage and overtime pay, the law requiring equal
pay for equal work, and the law requiring ﬁrms to grant family and
medical leave
2. Antidiscrimination laws
3. Occupational health and safety regulation as imposed by OSHA
4. Laws regulating employer and union behavior in the collective bar-
gaining process
B. Consumer products and services regulation
1. Mandated or forbidden features of consumer products and services,
especially medical products
2. Occupational licensure laws
C. Some environmental regulation [namely, the Endangered Species Act and
the provisions of the Clean Water Act that authorize wetlands regulation].
Arnold structures his analysis as follows. He distinguishes between “modern
liberalism” and “classical liberalism.” Modern liberalism is exempliﬁed by the
work of John Rawls, Ronald Dworkin, Joel Feinberg, Bruce Ackerman, John
Maynard Keynes, Paul Samuelson, and John Kenneth Galbraith (3). “Classical
liberals” include F. A. Hayek, Milton Friedman, James Buchanan, Robert Nozick,
Richard Epstein, Randy Barnett, Loren Lomasky, Jan Narveson, Tibor Machan,
Douglas Rasmussen, and Douglas Den Uyl (4). Both groups are liberals: they
share the basic conviction that individuals have fundamental political and per-
sonal rights that limit government, such as the right to free speech or the right
not to be incarcerated without a fair trial (17). However, by contrast withmodern
liberals, classical liberals believe in fundamental property rights and are suspi-
cious of governmental intervention in civil society (15, 18).
Arnold stresses that neither modern liberalism nor classical liberalism is a
single, comprehensive position. Rather, each is a cluster of “inclinations” (15)
and mid-level principles, which can be grounded in a variety of fundamental
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philosophical views. For example, Kantians can be found in both camps, as can
utilitarians (14–15).
Arnold draws a distinction within the family of classical liberal views, namely,
between “libertarians” and “nonlibertarians.” “Libertarians are classical liberals
who believe in the minimal state and nothing more extensive than the minimal
state” (25). Nonlibertarian classical liberals accept certain rationales for govern-
mental intervention that could, in principle, justify some governmental programs
going beyond the minimal state—in particular, preventing “negative externali-
ties” (28–36, 140); solving a genuine “public goods” problem (22–28, 140); or
blocking transactions that are involuntary because of “ignorance” on the part
of one of the parties (139). Moreover, nonlibertarian classical liberals believe—
or at least are willing seriously to entertain the possibility—that some existing
governmental programs (beyond the minimal state) are in fact justiﬁed by these
rationales.
Arnold’s critique of the modern liberal regulatory agenda takes the form of
a dialogue between modern liberals and nonlibertarian classical liberals. He iden-
tiﬁes three kinds of arguments that could persuade a nonlibertarian classical liberal
to accept some element of that agenda: “common ground,” “convergence,” and
“conversion” arguments (6–11, 133–34). A common ground argument appeals to
some principle accepted by both groups. (“For instance, a modern liberal might
successfully argue that a certain public good can best be secured or a certain
negative externality . . . can best be dealt with by government regulation. Since
securing public goods and dealing with negative externalities are proper functions
of government on both modern liberal and classical liberal views, classical liberals
could join in supporting this regulation” [6–7].) A convergence argument shows
that a governmental program is justiﬁable both in light ofmodern liberal principles
and in light of nonlibertarian classical liberal principles (even if not justiﬁable in
light of principles shared by both views). Finally, a conversion argument in favor
of some governmental program concedes that the program may not be justiﬁable
with reference to classical liberal principles, but seeks to show that an exception
from those principles should be made. Because the nonlibertarian classical liberal
properly understands her principles as “heuristic devices that serve as fallible guides
for thinking about questions of social policy” (8), not exceptionless rules, she
should be willing to entertain conversion arguments.
According to Arnold, none of these three strategies succeeds. Chapters 5
and 6 reject common ground and convergence arguments for themodern liberal
regulatory agenda. Chapters 7–10 are more detailed discussions of employment
law, antidiscrimination law, health and safety regulation, and land use regulation,
concluding in each case that a conversion argument is unsuccessful or at least
can be reasonably rejected. (The ﬁrst four chapters of the book set the stage
for this analysis—differentiating between modern and classical liberalism, ex-
ploring their views about private property, setting forth the trichotomy of ar-
guments, etc.)
Chapters 11–12 turn to the problem of “imposing values.” These chapters,
in effect, ask: What is the import, for the modern liberal, of the fact that the
modern liberal regulatory agenda is not justiﬁable from the perspective of clas-
sical liberalism? Does this fact undermine the legitimacy of the agenda within
the framework of modern liberalism itself?
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Imposing Values deserves credit for acknowledging that a robust concern for
individual property rights might be reconcilable with a fairly wide range of
governmental programs. To this extent, at least, the book is admirably nondog-
matic. Arnold certainly does not take the position that all existing regulatory
regimes in the United States, other than employment regulation, antidiscrimi-
nation law, health and safety regulation, and land use regulation, are in fact
justiﬁed by classic liberal lights. But, at a minimum, Arnold believes, those other
regimes are less clearly problematic, and thus they are not the focus of the
critique provided by Imposing Values (125–32; see also 69–116). This includes
“informational” regulation, for example, prohibitions of false or misleading ad-
vertising, or the requirement that goods or services be accompanied by various
kinds of disclosures; the regulation of the securities markets and the ﬁnancial
sector; the regulation of insurance; “mandatory seat belt laws, motorcycle helmet
laws, laws prohibiting or limiting gambling, prostitution, surrogacy contracts,
and laws prohibiting the use of recreational drugs” (131); and the bulk of
environmental law, including limitations on air and water pollution and haz-
ardous wastes.
Arnold is also certainly correct that regulatory programs in the United States
are vulnerable to a range of pathologies and that a sober and serious assessment
of any particular program should be sensitive to these pathologies. Interest
groups exert pressure to advance their own narrow aims. Firms and unions are
better organized than consumers and taxpayers. Governmental ofﬁcials are vul-
nerable to “tunnel vision” or to capture by groups. Legislators posture to secure
reelection, enacting statutes that fail to promote a sensible balancing of the
costs and beneﬁts of regulation (e.g., statutes that require environmental pres-
ervation or the elimination of health and safety risks with little regard for cost)
(331, 271–74). Where regulatory programs do have net beneﬁts in the aggregate,
the distribution of beneﬁts may be terribly unfair (329–46).
But Imposing Values has a number of substantial ﬂaws. First, insufﬁcient work
is done to motivate nonlibertarian classical liberalism—to show that this is a
normative view worthy of serious consideration. On the one hand, Arnold de-
clines to justify or specify the view by appealing to foundational principles, such
as utilitarianism (15, 143). Rather, as mentioned, he sees classical liberalism
generally, and its nonlibertarian variant more speciﬁcally, as a cluster of mid-
level principles ﬂowing from a variety of more foundational axioms. Yet Arnold
articulates the principles constitutive of nonlibertarian classical libertarianism
at a high level of speciﬁcity, sufﬁciently so that one must ask, is it really the case
that a wide range of authors in the classical liberal tradition would assent to
these principles? Why believe that reasonable utilitarians, Kantians, natural rights
theorists, and so forth would converge upon this particular framework for eval-
uating governmental programs?
For example, Arnold tells us that “classical liberals allow that it can be
appropriate for the state to provide public goods,” meaning inter alia that “each
individual in [the] population believes that the beneﬁts of having the good
outweigh her share of the cost” (144). He then proceeds to explain that an
individual’s “beneﬁt” is to be understood in terms of her dispositional rather
than conscious preferences, her actual rather than idealized preferences, and
her collective and altruistic as well as egoistic preferences; that public goods
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provision is justiﬁable absent universal beneﬁt, as long as the vast majority of
the population would beneﬁt; and that what needs to be justiﬁed is some level
of state provision of the public good, rather than the speciﬁc level actually
provided by the state (144–63).
This last proviso allows Arnold to claim that nonlibertarian classical liberals
should see the U.S. government’s military programs as being a genuine public
good. He concedes that “many people favor having a military . . . [but] would
favor a much smaller military at greatly reduced cost,” but he responds: “That
option is not on the table because of the nature of the question under discussion,
namely, the rationale for state provision of national defense. The public goods
apparatus answers the question of why the state should provide national defense.
Principles of representative democracy explain—and ultimately justify—why we
have the levels of defense spending that we do” (163). However, Arnold does
not demonstrate that other nonlibertarian scholars in the classical liberal tra-
dition understand the public goods justiﬁcation for government in the particular
manner that he does, or at least that they should do so, given their foundational
commitments.
Second, the formulation of the nonlibertarian classical liberal principle
regarding negative externalities—a key aspect of the view, which Arnold re-
peatedly brings to bear in discussing the justiﬁability of regulatory programs—
is problematic. “Classical liberals want to limit the negative externalities that
might warrant government intervention to boundary crossings of third parties
as deﬁned by the common law,” allowing that such “boundary crossings” can be
blocked by regulatory means as well as tort suits (31; see also 142). But the
project of characterizing tortious conduct as a “boundary crossing,” rather than
as faulty conduct, is unworkable. (See Stephen R. Perry, “The Impossibility of
General Strict Liability,” Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 1 [1988]:
147–71.)
Third, Arnold’s views regarding national defense undermine his claim that
the programs belonging to the modern liberal regulatory agenda do not satisfy
the public goods principle, as he has speciﬁed that principle: “There are simply
too many citizens who are not net beneﬁciaries of these laws for any of these
regulations to be represented as a state solution to a public goods problem. . . .
FDA and CSPC bureaucrats, plaintiff’s attorneys who practice employment law,
Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) personnel who enforce the ESA and OSHA
inspectors, these and other enforcers of the modern liberal regulatory agenda
do not enjoy the broad public support that, for example, the military has in
liberal societies” (188).
Particularly in the aftermath of the Iraq war, the claim that the U.S. military
enjoys “broad public support” is laughable. What Arnoldmeans to say (consistent
with his understanding of the public goods principle) is that there is broad
support for some military rather than no military at all, taking into account
individuals’ collective and altruistic as well as egoistic preferences. But presum-
ably there is broad support for some level of regulatory protection from dan-
gerous drugs, consumer products, and workplaces; for some level of govern-
mental intervention to stop the disappearance of endangered species and
ecosystems; and for some governmental measures to prevent employment dis-
crimination against groups (leaving open the particular form of such measures,
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e.g., whether they should bar disparate impact as well as discriminatory treat-
ment, and the range of groups protected, e.g., whether women, disabled persons,
and the aged, not merely racial minorities, should be protected).
Fourth, there is a large literature in applied economics that estimates the
costs and beneﬁts of various regulatory programs, but Arnold’s lengthy discus-
sion of each element of the modern liberal regulatory agenda does not draw
upon this literature in anything like a systematic way. One would have thought
that a reasonably comprehensive review of existing evidence regarding the actual
effects of employment law, antidiscrimination law, health and safety regulation,
and land use regulation would be critical in determining whether a “conversion
argument” for these programs can succeed.
Finally, Arnold’s discussion of “imposing values” in chapters 11 and 12 is
unconvincing. Assume that the reader is persuaded by the analysis in the preceding
chapters. She agrees that classical liberals, even those of the nonlibertarian variant,
could reasonably reject the modern liberal regulatory agenda. If this reader is a
modern liberal, her response might be: “So what? I believe that these programs
are justiﬁed.” In chapter 11, Arnold seeks to counter this response, suggesting
that modern liberals (as well as nonlibertarian classical liberals) should recognize
three conditions for the legitimacy of a regulatory program (at least a program
concerning which there is persisting reasonable disagreement), namely, a de-
mocracy condition, a public justiﬁcation condition, and a transparency condition.
The ﬁrst condition requires the program to have been enacted by “the elected
branches of government” (356). The public justiﬁcation condition demands, inter
alia, that public arguments be provided in favor of the program which are “suf-
ﬁciently atheoretical so that they could be found persuasive by nearly any liberal,
classical or modern” (365). The transparency condition says: “If legislators wish
to change . . . the scope of government, an intellectually serious and responsible
effort should bemade to identify the beneﬁciaries and victims . . . of the legislation
and to explain the manner in which they either beneﬁt or are harmed. . . . All
this has to be done in a public context, such as in a Senate or House committee
report or in legislative debate” (387). Chapter 12 then reviews selected regulatory
programs, concluding that most fail to meet these criteria for legitimate “value
imposition.”
But it is untrue that modern liberals would generally accept Arnold’s three
criteria. Remember that modern liberalism, like classical liberalism, is compat-
ible with a range of fundamental commitments. In particular, modern liberals
might be Rawlsians or deliberative democrats, but they might also be utilitarians
(350) or for that matter nonutilitarian consequentialists, for example, priori-
tarian or egalitarian consequentialists. A consequentialist modern liberal would
presumably recognize some form of democracy requirement (monarchies and
dictatorships haven’t worked out so well). But that requirement might well allow
for legislative delegation of power to administrative agencies, which is arguably
quite beneﬁcial. (See Jerry Mashaw, “Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should
Make Political Decisions,” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 1 [1985]:
81–100.) And why would a consequentalist modern liberal accept a public jus-
tiﬁcation condition? It is highly speculative that constraining the particular kinds
of arguments offered to justify legislation in fact produces better outcomes.
Finally, consequentialist modern liberals would presumably accept some form
836 Ethics July 2010
of transparency requirement (it seems plausible that public airing of the costs
and beneﬁts of regulatory programs tends to improve the quality of these pro-
grams), but they might well deny that transparency requires a special kind of
legislative history. Why not say that a program is sufﬁciently transparent, by
modern liberal lights, if its impacts have become public in some manner? By
this standard, the very fact of vigorous and continuing debate about the modern
liberal regulatory agenda—a debate prosecuted by classical liberals and other
critics of these programs, such as Arnold himself—means that the programs
satisfy the transparency requirement now, whether or not they satisﬁed it at their
date of enactment.
In short, Arnold’s “imposing values” argument is a nonstarter. Imposing Values
therefore fails to realize its ultimate ambition—to offer a nonsectarian case against
the modern liberal regulatory agenda, showing not only that classical liberals
should reject it (by virtue of the failure of common ground, convergence, and
conversion arguments), but that modern liberals should as well (by virtue of the
failure of the democracy, public justiﬁcation, and transparency requirements).
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